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ABSTRACT
The many definitions of technoscience are offered as correctives to an ideal of pure science, 
completely separate from society. The critique of purity in Science and Technology Studies 
was preceded by phenomenological critiques in Heidegger and Marcuse. The idea of purity 
is no longer credible. Yet the concept of pure science has played a role historically in de-
fending science against political interference. The concept of technoscience risks opening 
science to such interference and has provoked a renewed and rather futile defense of its 
purity. The consensus in STS that science is fundamentally social seems to obviate the need 
for a term such as technoscience. This paper suggests a restrictive definition of technosci-
ence based on the multiplication of independent tests of validity. This is an extreme case of 
the sociality of science because here science and technology emerge together rather than 
theory preceding application. Technoscience under this definition would describe scientific 
work, validated scientifically, that serves simultaneously in commercial and public processes 
which have their own independent logic and tests of validity. Under this definition, the ex-
istence of complex interactions between science and society does not blur the boundaries 
between these tests. Technoscience is embedded in society like all science, but is unique in 
standing at a “fork” between distinct languages and criteria of success. 
Keywords: Technoscience, STS, Heidegger, Marcuse, science/society.
RESUMO
As muitas definições de tecnociência são oferecidas como corretivas para um ideal de ciên-
cia pura, completamente separada da sociedade. A crítica da pureza nos estudos de ciência 
e tecnologia foi precedida por críticas fenomenológicas em Heidegger e Marcuse. A ideia 
de pureza não é mais credível. No entanto, o conceito de ciência pura tem desempenhado 
um papel histórico na defesa da ciência contra interferências políticas. O conceito de tec-
nociência corre o risco de abrir a ciência a essa interferência e tem provocado uma defesa 
renovada e fútil da sua pureza. O consenso nos estudos de ciência e tecnologia de que a 
ciência é fundamentalmente social parece obviar a necessidade de um termo como tecno-
ciência. Este artigo sugere uma definição restritiva de tecnociência com base na multipli-
cação de testes independentes de validade. Este é um caso extremo da sociabilidade da 
ciência, porque aqui a ciência e a tecnologia emergem juntas, em vez de a teoria preceder 
a aplicação. A tecnociência sob essa definição descreveria o trabalho científico, validado 
cientificamente, que serve simultaneamente em processos comerciais e públicos que têm 
sua própria lógica e testes de validade independentes. Sob essa definição, a existência de 
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Two images of science
The first West ern philosopher, Thales of Miletus, figures 
in two stories that illustrate very different images of science. 
In the first of these stories Thales is an ivory tower thinker. It 
is said that one night as he surveyed the heavens, he slipped 
and fell into a ditch. An old woman passing by laughed and 
asked how he could understand the stars when he failed to 
see what was right there under his nose. This is the popular 
image of pure science that prevailed also in philosophy and 
social thought until fairly recently. But there is another story 
which projects a very different image of science. It is said that 
Thales studied the weather in his home town and one winter 
predicted a bumper olive crop. He optioned all the local olive 
presses and when the crop came in, he made a fortune renting 
them out at a profit. This version of Thales anticipates the 
alliance of science and business that prevails today. 
The ivory tower image was based on a certain under-
standing of theoretical physics, the most basic of basic sci-
ences. Theoretical physics is a mathematical discipline that 
appears on the surface very remote from the world of tech-
nology, both in terms of applications and experimentation. 
Physicists in glorious isolation were said to input data from 
experiments in their equations, leaving the applications to en-
gineers and other lesser under-laborers. 
This image of physics as a pure intellectual discipline was 
supported by positivist philosophy of science which became 
dominant in philosophy departments in the English-sp eaking 
world after World War II. In the 1980s scholars in the field 
of Science and Technology Studies (STS) took up the term 
“technoscience” in react ion against positivism.3 The philos-
ophers who popularized the term proposed a more realistic 
image of science compatible with Thales the scientific entre-
preneur. They argued that science is essentially connected to 
technology, that it has always had an applied asp ect and that 
its vision of nature depends on what can be done with tech-
nological instruments. This concept of technoscience usefully 
corrects the notion of pure science.4
However, there is a tendency to overstate the case, to try 
to obliterate the distinction between science and technology. 
“Technoscience” is a confusing term if it is intended to obliter-
ate the obvious differences between scientific research and most 
work with technology. Those differences cannot be erased by a 
clever terminological invention. Although they all use technolo-
gy, the problems faced by truck drivers and construction workers 
are rather different from the concerns of theoretical physicists. 
Blurring the distinction is worrisome because it opens the door 
to political regulation of science on the same terms as technol-
ogy. Routine regulation of technology protects us from many 
hazards, but one would not want scientific theories to be subject 
to politics in the same way. The Russians tried this with genet-
ics and killed the science in their country for 50 years.5 Today 
Trump engages in the political manipulation of climate science. 
Some definitions of technoscience emphasize the epoch-
al change that results from the breakdown of the divide be-
tween nature and culture in our time. Science no longer stud-
ies a supposedly pristine nature but rather artificial materials 
such as computers and nanotechnologies. Experimentation 
used to place natural phenomena in an artificial environment 
but today in fields such as particle physics the phenomena are 
actually produced for study in huge machines. 
The emphasis of research may indeed have shifted but 
the refining of metal ores crossed the nature/culture divide 
in the bronze age. Plant and animal breeding go back much 
further and similarly blur the boundary between nature and 
culture. The claim that an epochal change has occurred in the 
relation of nature and culture is less relevant to science than 
to industry, where the scale of human intervention is now 
much greater than in the past. 
Other definitions of technoscience claim that science is 
now fully incorporated into the corporate and public process-
es of advanced societies. Certainly the involvement of busi-
ness and government in research has expanded enormously in 
recent years. But the epistemic implications of this evolution 
are in dispute. This concept of technoscience is sometimes 
articulated in terms of post-modern relativism, as though 
the est ablishment of a scientific theory could be compared to 
business success. The “Science Wars” were provoked by such 
notions. The dangers of such a relativistic view are becoming 
clear with the election of science skeptics such as Trump and 
Modi. Yet there is surely a connection between science and 
society and that connection is perhaps deeper today that at 
any time in the past.
interações complexas entre ciência e sociedade não obscurece as fronteiras entre esses tes-
tes. A tecnociência está inserida na sociedade, como toda ciência, mas é única ao se situar 
em um “garfo” [ataque duplo no xadrez] entre linguagens distintas e critérios de sucesso.
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In what follows I will propose a qualified version of this 
last definition of technoscience, one that I think is useful for 
understanding the political implications of the engagement of 
science and society, while avoiding the relativism sometimes 
associated with that concept. I will begin now with a little 
personal history that helps to understand what is right about 
the basic idea behind the concept of technoscience. 
The ambiguities of 
technoscience
This is personal because I grew up in the midst of theo-
retical physics. My father was one of the young students sent 
by American universities to Germany in the 1930s to learn 
quantum mechanics at the source. Unwittingly, these uni-
versities prepared America for war. In 1939 Einstein wrote 
to Roosevelt proposing that the US attempt to develop an 
atom bomb. In 1942 the Army Corps of Engineers initiated 
the Manhattan Project. Around this time a colleague came to 
visit my father and asked where they could sp eak in absolute 
privacy. On the roof of our New York apartment building he 
extended an invitation to join the Manhattan Project. My 
father declined for reasons he never really explained and in-
stead went to work on the development of radar. 
During the war, he patented several improvements in a 
sp ecial type of vacuum tube called a klystron. This is a very 
powerful generator of shortwave radio waves used in radar. 
Some years later, when I was about 10 years old, my father 
was invited for the summer to Stanford University where the 
klystron was invented. There he and his colleagues worked on 
the design of the Stanford Linear Accelerator, a high-energy 
machine that accelerated electrons to relativistic velocities. 
The wife of one of his Stanford colleagues organized a crystal 
radio club for the children of the physicists. While the dads 
were working with radio waves generated by klystrons, we 
kids were busy figuring out how to detect a radio signal with 
a chunk of silicon. 
What is the point of the story? Theoretical physics may 
well resemble the positivist idea of purity, but it was no prob-
lem for a theoretical physicist to work on technology at his 
country’s call. One would not expect a sociologist or a French 
professor to find this such an easy transition. And it was also 
possible for that work to lead to new instruments for detect-
ing features of nature that had never before been seen, leading 
to further progress in pure science. Here the usual concept of 
technoscience is validated in its main outlines.
But the introduction of the concept in the context of the 
polemic against positivism has obscured the social function of the 
notion of pure science. The sharp division between theory and 
application was instituted by the nineteenth century research 
university. Pure science was granted the dignity of a disinterest-
ed search for truth and located alongside fields such as philology 
and history from which no pract ical or pecuniary application 
was expected. This supported the independence of science and 
the right of scientists to engage in basic research. Scientists saw 
themselves as intellectuals involved in higher culture on terms 
similar to literary scholars or historians. Of course there have 
always been important applications of science, even as it was in-
stitutionalized in the ivory tower in the late nineteenth century. 
That was when great scientists invented vaccines and artificial 
dyes. But maintaining the idea of pure science was still important 
for legitimating work that had no obvious pract ical value such as, 
for example, the sp ecial theory of relativity. 
The emphasis changed after the Second World War. Three 
scientific innovations played an important role in the allied vic-
tory. These were the atom bomb, radar, and cryptography. After 
1945 the American military saw science as a key to victory in 
the Cold War. The US government proposed to fund science 
while bringing it under direct military control. This would have 
involved rigorous security, secrecy, and draconian punishments 
for violations of the new regulations. Scientists resisted and suc-
ceeded finally in creating the current system of grants and con-
tracts administered by universities.6 In this way they protected 
their independence while benefiting from the vastly increased 
funding available for scientific research. The ideology of pure 
science played an important role in the success of this compro-
mise with the military. Let the scientists pursue what Vannevar 
Bush called the “endless frontier” of research in the university, and 
eventually useful applications will trickle down, as indeed they 
did. From this point of view one sees the advantage of positivism. 
By isolating science completely from the world of technology one 
protects it from intrusive regulation.
The fact that the personal experiences and act ivities of 
scientists contradicted the ideological notion of pure science 
was easily overlooked. The purity of so-called pure science 
was no obstacle to scientists relying on ever more complex 
technologies in their exploration of nature while contributing 
ever more applications to the military and business. But the 
gap between the idea of pure science and the technoscientific 
reality has widened in recent years. The biological sciences 
are now the model science, replacing theoretical physics. The 
distinction between pure and applied science breaks down in 
biology to an unprecedented degree. A great deal of biological 
research is directly supported by pharmaceutical companies 
and other businesses that are not engaged in a disinterest-
ed pursuit of truth but rather seek profitable products. And 
while much progress has been made, the consequences are ex-
actly what the scientists feared from military control, namely 
secrecy and corruption of research by external forces. 
In an earlier paper, I suggest ed a restricted definition 
of “technoscience” based on these considerations (Feenberg, 
2018).7 I proposed that we reserve the term for scientific re-
6 The story is told by Alice K. Smith in the book A Peril and a Hope, 1965, chapter 10.
7 See also Feenberg, 2009, p. 63-81.
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search that has an immediate role in the development of appli-
cations of some sort. In such cases theory and application are 
not separate phases that proceed in isolation from each other 
at separate times and places, but are pursued simultaneous-
ly. I compared this situation to a “fork” in chess, a move that 
threatens two of the adversary’s pieces. This is the case, for 
example, where the experimental apparatus is a prototype of 
a future technology. In such cases the innovation must satisfy 
two separate audiences with different criteria of success, the 
scientific community and the commercial partner.
Cold fusion served as my example, because in that case 
the experimental apparatus was treated as a commercial pro-
totype. Cold fusion failed the epistemic tests to which it was 
subjected and the whole project collapsed. I could also have re-
ferred to any number of research programs in medicine, some 
of which do succeed, unlike cold fusion. The point is that in 
such cases there is no need to wait for a subsequent application 
of scientific principles because the research is the application. 
Here the relation between the two defies the differentiation of 
science and society without violating the epistemic criteria of 
scientific success. In the concluding sections of this paper I will 
propose a broader application of the notion of technoscience as 
a fork between science and society. This generalization of the 
concept recognizes the increasing dependence of public under-
standing and act ion on scientific research and the simultaneous 
participation of the public in orienting that research. 
Transcendental technoscience
So far I have been describing the social world of science. 
The concept of technoscience in all its various formulations in-
troduces a more realistic picture of that world than the earlier 
vision of pure science. But it also raises a fundamental question. 
What is it about scientific thinking that lends itself so readily to 
technological application? What is it about science that ties it to 
a world seen through technology? Something more basic than 
social history is necessary to answer these questions. I want to 
now consider several philosophers’ explanation for the deep con-
nection between science and technology.
That connection was announced early by Descartes and 
Bacon and was associated with the idea of progress. But in the 
early 20th century a critical discourse arose, associating science 
and technology with the reduction of human beings to cogs 
in a vast social machine. This dystopian prosp ect achieved a 
sophisticated formulation in the post-war writings of Martin 
Heidegger. His former student, Herbert Marcuse, pursued 
the critique of science and technology in an alternative to 
Heidegger’s formulation.8
Heidegger and Marcuse share a key concept, the tran-
scendental notion of object construction. According to this 
notion, each field of research defines a sp ecific kind of object 
through its methods and concepts. In one sense this is obvi-
ous. Physics for example considers matter in motion while bi-
ology considers life, and so on. But these philosophers regard 
such definitions as only the beginning of a far more detailed 
sp ecification of the way in which a certain cross-section of re-
ality is carved out for investigation. That refined cross-section 
constitutes the object of study.
Both of these philosophers introduce history into the tran-
scendental approach. Kant, who invented the transcendental 
approach, explained it as an operation the subject performed on 
the givens of experience. Transcendental forms were said to be 
imposed by the mind on a content such as raw sensations. But 
Heidegger and Marcuse agree that the forms change in history. 
Heidegger calls the succession of such forms “the history of being” 
and Marcuse attributes the changes to the evolution of modes 
of production. In both cases an anonymous historical process 
rather than an individual mind is responsible for the imposition 
of form on content. Perhaps this approach should therefore be 
called “quasi-transcendental” since the source of the forms is 
changeable and, in Marcuse’s case, inner-worldly.
Neither Heidegger nor Marcuse deny that science stud-
ies reality, but given the role of the subject in object construc-
tion, common sense realism is excluded. Furthermore, there is 
no reason to grant science an exclusive license on the truth of 
the real. Other object constructions may reveal other truths, 
hidden to science by the limitations of its own construction. 
Heidegger argues that modern science projects a quan-
tifiable idea of nature that is intrinsically oriented toward 
technical control. He calls this a “ground plan” that anticipates 
in advance the sorts of things that can appear as objects of 
research. His example is physics for which nature is stipulat-
ed to consist of a self-contained system of motion of units 
of mass related in time and space. Motion here means only 
change of place in a uniform continuum. This definition of 
the object suits it to the est ablishment of exact mathematical 
measurement. Modern science relies on mathematical proce-
dures since it defines its object as the sort of thing that can be 
measured and counted. 
Heidegger argues further that modern science produces 
an image or representation of the world. He calls this a “world 
picture,” that is, a supposedly exhaustive representation of re-
ality. This seems self-evident: science gives us an image of the 
cosmos we accept as a more or less accurate picture of reality. 
But according to Heidegger this is a uniquely modern way of 
understanding the real. It makes possible prediction and tech-
nical manipulation. The interconnection of science and tech-
nology lies in the original ground plan which exposes nature 
to both representation by science and control by technology. 
Modern and ancient science are radically different.9
The difference stems from their conceptions of nature. The 
8 See Martin Heidegger, 1977. See also Herbert Marcuse, 1964, chapters 5 and 6. For my interpretation of these chapters, see Andrew 
Feenberg, 2013, 604-614. See my discussion of these thinkers in Andrew Feenberg, 2019, chapter 9.
9 See Heidegger, 1977.
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ancient concept, exemplified by Aristotle’s Metaphysics, is de-
rived from biological growth and craft. It corresponds closely 
with the everyday ontology that phenomenology describes as 
the Lebenswelt. Ancient Greece did not identify the essence 
of reality with a representation, a picture, but with a process. 
The Greeks encountered a self-creating, self-moving nature 
consisting of relatively stable things that realize their intrin-
sic potentialities through change. This nature has a life of its 
own independent of the subject. This developmental process 
cannot be measured in quantitative terms and gives rise to no 
theoretical representation. The same word, kinesis, signifies 
these qualitative changes and mere movement in space such 
as our science recognizes. 
The modern scientific picture of nature eliminates 
self-movement and intrinsic potentiality. Nature is meaning-
less and utterly dependent on the subject for which it serves 
as a raw material dominated through instrumental control. 
Heidegger calls the reduction of the world to manipulable 
resources the Ge-stell. Modern technology thus differs from 
ancient craft, which realizes potentialities of nature that na-
ture cannot realize by itself. The technē of a craftsman must 
intervene in bringing those potentialities into actuality. No 
such mutual interact ion of subject and object is involved in 
the Ge-stell.
Heidegger intended this theory to be critical but not 
anti-scientific. What troubled him was the absorption of the 
human being into the ground plan of science as just another 
object exposed to representation and control. But he did not 
criticize science for this but rather the spirit of the modern 
age and its understanding of science. This critique of moder-
nity leaves very little room for alternatives.10 Heidegger would 
have rejected anything resembling “New Age” re-enchant-
ment. Using myth or religion in order to reest ablish meaning 
in life would simply instrumentalize these spiritual resources 
and so recapitulate the original problem of universal techni-
fication. He offered no way out and in his last interview said 
“only a God can save us” (Heidegger, 1993).
I turn now to Marcuse’s alternative approach which has 
much in common with Heidegger’s but offers a more hope-
ful prosp ect. Marcuse’s discussion of science follows more or 
less along the lines laid out by Heidegger. He too argues that 
science is based on a concept of nature which exposes it to 
quantification and control. He quotes Heidegger as saying, 
“modern man takes the entirety of being as raw material for 
production and subjects the entirety of the object world to 
the sweep and order of production” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 153). 
The essence of modern science is the elimination of intrinsic 
potentiality in favor of measurable facts. The Greeks con-
ceived potentialities as real properties of objects, essences, but 
essences are now dismissed as mere cultural prejudices. Our 
model of technical act ion is not cultivation but clear cutting. 
Since reality no longer offers any guidance for act ion, all goals 
appear equally arbitrary and science and technology are sur-
rendered to the prevailing social and economic powers.
Marcuse’s analysis differs from Heidegger’s in arguing 
that this instrumentalist conception of nature is due not to 
modernity as such but sp ecifically to capitalism. He follows 
Husserl in arguing that science refines and develops pract ices 
of quantification and control it finds in everyday life. Mar-
cuse adds that those pract ices are shaped by capitalism. This 
would explain why modern science and technology have aris-
en at the same time as capitalism and serve it well. 
What Marcuse calls “one-dimensionality” is the gen-
eralization of scientific instrumentalism as common sense, 
replacing traditional normatively charged ideas and attitudes 
that formerly shaped the everyday relation to the world. This 
change is politically significant. If the world is reduced to a 
vast collection of measurable facts subject to technical con-
trol, its potentialities are obscured. It can be modified tech-
nically in this or that resp ect but not fundamentally changed. 
Operationally effective reforms can eliminate the desire for 
change short of any challenge to the capitalist organization of 
social life. The problem is thus not only the destructive power 
of science and technology but the elimination of the potential 
for a more just form of society. 
Attributing the rise of science to a sp ecific socioeconom-
ic system suggests the possibility of change through political 
act ion. Marcuse was a Marxist who believed that a revolu-
tion would modify not only economic arrangements but 
the very conception of nature. A socialist modernity would 
integrate science and art in a new, more benign technology 
resp ectful of nature. This would be the revival of something 
like ancient technē, and with it the recovery of the idea of po-
tentiality, banned from the modern scientific idea of nature 
and modern experience (Marcuse, 1964, p. 238-240).
Marcuse’s position appeals intuitively to our sense that 
things have gone terribly wrong in recent times despite, or 
perhaps he would say, because of the many reforms that have 
made life under capitalism tolerable. Furthermore, an ontol-
ogy that denies essences contradicts our sense that human 
beings have potentialities that can be frustrated or realized 
depending on their social and economic circumstances. Na-
ture appears to us increasingly threatened by our crude tech-
nological assault on its integrity. In some sense this suggests 
that nature too has potentialities we can favor or deny.
Nevertheless it is difficult to see how modern science 
could function in the context of a different concept of na-
ture. Marcuse seems to have been aware of the difficulty 
because he rejected the notion of a qualitative physics. That 
would be a science like Aristotle’s that identifies the essential 
potentialities of things rather than measuring them. So how 
does Marcuse intend to avoid regression to such a qualitative 
10 Heidegger is infamous for having imagined that Nazism could be such an alternative. He was quickly disillusioned with the regime but 
never gave up his own personal version of Nazi ideology. This testifies to a despicable character flaw, but his critique of modernity is 
similar to that of many who did not share his political views and need not be dismissed on that account.
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science? Furthermore, in the absence of a scientific ground 
for the identification of potentiality what grants our notion 
of it objective status? Aristotle did not have to address these 
questions because he took his culture’s conventional ideas of 
potential for granted. Nor was this a problem for Heidegger 
since he left the future in the hands of God. But Marcuse 
projects a human future, humanly created in harmony with 
the potentialities of nature and human nature and so faces 
great theoretical difficulties.
The two natures
Behind the arguments of Heidegger and Marcuse there 
lies a sense of loss. What is lost is the immediate relation to 
living nature that can be presumed to charact erize premod-
ern times. The scientific representation of nature is radically 
simplified in being reduced to a collection of measurable facts. 
The generalization in public understanding of that simplified 
nature impoverishes experience. Heidegger writes, “The bot-
anist’s plants are not the flowers in the hedgerow; the ‘source’ 
which the geographer est ablishes for a river is not the ‘spring-
head in the dale’” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 100). As Goethe’s Me-
phistopheles says, “Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie und 
grün des Lebens goldner Baum” (Goethe, 1962, p. 206).11
Walter Benjamin explained something similar in the 
context of film production. His remarks can be taken as re-
ferring metaphorically to modern life: 
In the studio the mechanical equipment 
has penetrated so deeply into reality that 
its pure aspect freed from the foreign sub-
stance of equipment is the result of a spe-
cial procedure, namely, the shooting by the 
specially adjusted camera and the mounting 
of the shot together with other similar ones. 
The equipment-free aspect of reality here 
has become the height of artifice; the sight 
of immediate reality has become an orchid 
in the land of technology (Benjamin, 1969, 
p. 233).
In this new technological world, Heidegger feared that 
human beings had come to see themselves as mere resources. 
Marcuse feared that modern consciousness was incapable of 
going beyond the given facts toward their potentialities. The 
dystopian persp ective of these philosophers was justified by 
the seemingly universal acceptance of the technified world. 
At the time they wrote, there was pract ically no resistance 
to the developing technocracy and social movements that 
challenged science and technology, such as the environmen-
tal movement, were very small. Social science was so strongly 
imbued with positivism that it offered no useful starting point 
for the sort of reforms Marcuse envisaged. Only philosophy 
and literature held out for humanity, and they were weak ves-
sels on which to pin one’s hopes.
So much resistance has emerged in recent years that 
the fears of Heidegger and Marcuse no longer seem justi-
fied, but nature’s orchids have not been recovered. Those re-
sistances defy the one-dimensional reduction of experience 
and act ivate the perception of a nature with potentialities 
relevant to human well-being. This is the consequence of 
the threats to health generated by the externalities of in-
dustry. Experiential nature thus emerges amidst the world 
of technology as Benjamin supposed, but negatively, not as 
pristine but as damaged. This nature is neither the object of 
science nor the wilderness of earlier times, but a sp ecialized 
function of the technological environment. 
The relation to nature implied in environmentalism is 
not the detachment of the researcher, nor the instrumental-
ism of the invest or, but is divided between fear of technologi-
cal risks and aesthetic appreciation. The challenge of the envi-
ronmental movement is to awaken these human relations to 
nature in a social world that privileges economic exploitation, 
considers only scientific objectivity valid, and stigmatizes 
fears as “hysterical” while dismissing aesthetics as “romantic.” 
What Marcuse calls the “erotic” world relation environmen-
talism must rest ore is the capacity to recognize our participa-
tion in the natural world through revulsion at its destruction.
Today we have concrete ways of envisaging the reform 
of science for which Marcuse called based on actual social 
movements in domains such as environmentalism. These 
movements rest ore what we might call the “Aristotelian” 
sense of nature, as fraught with potentialities, and recall hu-
man beings to their responsibilities toward that nature. But 
this development does not directly alter the scientific object 
as Marcuse expected. Rather, it engages science with society 
in new ways. The historical divide between two different 
ideas of nature, the ancient and the modern scientific, must 
now be recomposed as a tension within modernity.
The environmental movement is based on the distinc-
tion between the two natures, derived not from philosophy 
but from pract ical experience. The nature environmental-
ists hope to protect is the one in which they participate, 
the experiential nature encountered in everyday life. It has 
a teleological asp ect science does not recognize, yet it de-
pends for its survival and well-being on scientific and tech-
nical knowledge. The scientific representation of nature is 
radically simplified, but that second nature, as the basis of 
technology, gives power over the first nature of everyday ex-
perience both for good and ill.
Not only does scientific nature offer remedies for envi-
ronmental problems, it enters into the public understanding 
of those problems. It is not unusual for science to have an im-
pact on public understanding. Think of the impact of geolo-
gy and evolutionary theory on the place of religion in social 
life. Heidegger and Marcuse believed asp ects of the scientific 
11 “Gray, my dear friend, is every theory, And green alone life’s golden tree.”
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worldview had penetrated everyday understanding, cancel-
ling the sp ecificity of experiential nature. But in the case of 
environmentalism the connection is more entangled: public 
understanding is based on scientific concepts that interpret 
the actual data of lived experience without cancelling its te-
leological form. The two natures enter into communication.
Concepts such as “pollution” are no longer just techni-
cal terms but join the vernacular in the description of expe-
rience. Nature is now conceived in its relation to the whole 
sociotechnical network to which it belongs, and not simply 
as non-social “stuff ” available as a resource. What we might 
call its “Aristotelian” charact er reappears prominently as its 
condition is evaluated in teleological terms: nature is sick or 
healthy, abused or protected. Experiential nature, unlike sci-
entific nature, has potentialities that can serve as normative 
criteria. This is the “existential truth” of nature Marcuse pos-
tulates but in a different form than he imagined (Marcuse, 
1972, p. 69). These potentialities are relative to human per-
ceptions and needs, so they are easily dismissed as anthropo-
morphic from a scientistic standpoint. But they are none the 
less real in the sense that they are physically manifest in the 
natural world that can be perceived and touched. 
Growth is a property of living things that appears dif-
ferently to science and everyday experience. The stream full 
of trout is no illusion and its flourishing is a real quality of its 
being in the same way that the flourishing of a plant or a child 
testifies to an underlying reality. Science describes the process 
from stage to stage but rejects any teleological explanation or 
normative evaluation of the result. Everyday experience sees 
a progress toward an end, the fulfillment of a potential. Such 
teleological perception organizes a good deal of human inter-
act ion with the surrounding world. It is not “subjective” in the 
pejorative sense but gives access to a different asp ect of reality 
from science. With environmentalism these two natures are 
in communication. The scientific nature facilitates the rest o-
ration of the telos of the lived nature of everyday experience.
The climate change movement illustrates these conclu-
sions. Climate disasters such as hurricanes present themselves 
ambiguously, as either normal variations in the weather or as 
evidence of impending catastrophe. Climate science disam-
biguates these experiences and provides ideas and a language 
in which to express the increasing anxiety individuals feel in 
the face of experiential nature. The public does not perceive its 
situation with the detachment of science, but rather in terms 
of the potentialities of nature to support civilization. The two 
natures come together and motivate public protest in favor of 
radical technological change. The “fork” between science and 
society where research is simultaneously theory and technolo-
gy appears here in the imbrication of the two natures.
Technosystem
What I call the “technosystem” is the vast concatenation 
of organized markets, bureaucracies, and a wide-ranging tech-
nical apparatus that organizes life in advanced capitalist soci-
eties (Feenberg, 2017). All these institutions and technologies 
are based on technical disciplines which take the form of sci-
ences even if, as in the case of management science, they have 
little claim to a scientific basis. Reified concepts and methods 
are employed to shape a world based on “laws” regulating the 
behavior of individual actors cast in an instrumental relation 
to the institutions. Throughout the technosystem resistances 
emerge similar in form to the environmental movement in 
fields such as medicine and urban design. 
Reified technology appears as a pure application of sci-
entific laws, but that appearance is shattered by one or anoth-
er sort of public pressure and resistance. The technology can 
then be mediated, that is, taken as a presupposition of social 
act ion, and transformed in the course of the iterative design 
process. The process is also dedifferentiating as the bound-
aries between technical experts and lay publics break down 
temporarily to yield to a more or less conflictual dialogue be-
tween them. This dialogue results in changes in the prevailing 
designs, implemented by experts through innovations that 
translate public demands into technical sp ecifications. 
The dereification of particular technologies may impact 
the technosciences on which they depend. These disciplines 
appear fixed and frozen, determined by pure rationality. But 
despite the appearances, new priorities articulated by social 
movements can change the discourse. Demands for such 
things as less polluting automobiles or more “natural” child-
birth procedures are eventually translated into technical 
terms and inscribed in the texts on the basis of which pract i-
tioners are trained. This is possible without loss of technical 
rationality insofar as the prevailing disp ensation is technically 
underdetermined, only one among several technically ratio-
nal configurations. The new disp ensation is once again reified, 
presented in quasi-scientific terms. These new reifications 
may then be challenged in a subsequent public intervention. 
Technosciences now proliferate that operate across the 
boundary between science, technology and politics main-
tained by academic institutions in the past. The intrinsic re-
lation of science and technology is not just a function of the 
concept of nature, as Heidegger and Marcuse argued, but is 
also a present disciplinary reality. Technosciences that barely 
existed for these philosophers are now central to our vision of 
science. These disciplines respond to properly epistemic ques-
tions posed by researchers while simultaneously addressing 
other question posed by corporations, governments and the 
general public. And as Isabelle Stengers argues, these are all 
legitimate questions responding to different concerns and dif-
ferent understandings of nature (Stengers and Drumm, 2013, 
p. 129-134). Together they lay out the terrain on which sci-
ence, technology and society now interact. These interact ions 
are not just external but engage a mutual co-construction.  
These effects are particularly clear in the early stages of 
the development of a technoscience, before its object has been 
firmly est ablished. Consider ecology, which emerged in the 
form we know it today out of a confrontation in the early 20th
century between organic holism and a non-teleological “ma-
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terialist” conception of the ecosystem. 
As Foster, Clark and York tell the story, two different 
ideas of nature contended for dominance in the new sci-
ence (2010, chapter 14). One group of scientists proposed 
to found ecology on a natural “superorganism,” organized 
in a hierarchy of forms according to teleological laws. An-
other group proposed a nature of multiple contingently re-
lated organisms governed by causal laws. The controversy 
had both epistemic and political dimensions. The holistic 
view was associated with a racially charged understanding 
of colonialism, while the alternative materialist view had af-
finities with socialism. In the end, the materialist view was 
both more productive scientifically and more in line with 
the contemporary conception of human rights. It success-
fully navigated the “fork” between science and the public. 
Materialist ecology answered two different types of ques-
tions, questions about patterns of interdependence between 
organisms, and questions about how to understand our hu-
manity and the relation to nature it implies.
Ecology is not simply applied to policy, but arises from it. 
From the standpoint of “pure” science, the earth can get along 
fine without us, but ecology is predicated on the problem of 
human survival and serves that end by defining dangers and 
thresholds of change. To be sure, ecology employs the meth-
ods of scientific research. It conceives nature along the stan-
dard lines of physics, chemistry, and biology. Quantification 
lies at its core. But at the same time it is animated implicitly 
by what traditional philosophy would call a conception of 
the good. It translates into scientific terms bridging concepts 
of health and sustainability that refer to potentialities of its 
objects. These bridging concepts respond to concerns of citi-
zens but they infuse the science by orienting it toward sp ecific 
types of problems and measures.
Climate science, for example, is oriented toward pre-
dicting effects that will impact human civilization. Human 
beings have never had a merely idle interest in the climate. 
As the story of Thales and the olive harvest shows, the study 
of the climate was initially motivated by a pragmatic inter-
est in agriculture. The climate was understood to be beyond 
human control but attempts to predict it never ceased. In 
1896 Svante Arrhenius showed that human act ivities affect 
the climate, thus bringing the object “climate” into the scope 
of history. In recent years climate science has begun to guide 
interventions into the climate to maintain the conditions of 
human civilization. The object, “climate,” has been construct-
ed and reconstructed over and over again. 
As awareness of climate change spreads among the pop-
ulation, social movements arise. The climate is not simply 
natural any longer, nor even historical, it is political. The pol-
itics aims to place a natural phenomenon on the agenda of 
public discussion. In democracies, there are familiar methods 
for accomplishing this, such as demonstrations, petitioning 
government officials, participation in hearings and elections, 
and so on. The object of all this act ivity is informed by sci-
ence, but it is not precisely the same object as the one sci-
entists study. Rather, the nature targeted by the social move-
ment encompasses scientific nature in experiential nature. 
That latter nature is dereified in the sense that it is no longer 
viewed as a fixed and unchangeable object of measurement, 
a fate to which humanity must adjust, but now appears as 
fraught with potentialities to flourish and support human life. 
And that experiential nature in turn informs the research of 
climate science where it is translated into the humanly indif-
ferent form of quantitative measures and predictions. 
Technoscience in this sense answers Marcuse’s require-
ment that science recover a notion of potentiality, but it does 
so differently than he imagined. We could extend this argu-
ment to other disciplines as well. Urban planning, architec-
ture, epidemiology, medicine, some versions of management 
theory are all developed around a concept of the good of the 
populations they affect. And this good is not simply a subjec-
tive wish but flows simultaneously from the struggles of the 
individuals concerned and the study of human needs and ca-
pacities in the contexts in which these disciplines intervene. 
Here the constitution of the research object and the up-
take of theoretical knowledge in society form a single whole 
that cannot be disaggregated into mechanically separated 
parts. Of course there is a division of labor between differ-
ent asp ects of the network formed by science and society. But 
each asp ect is defined by its relation to the other. 
Conclusion
The empirical study of science by STS has made the 
point that the boundary between science and technology is 
less clear than was assumed in earlier times. Heidegger and 
Marcuse anticipated this conclusion. They posited a tran-
scendental link between science and technology underlying 
the empirical trends traced by historians and sociologists. For 
them the point was not that science was applied or relied on 
instruments to perceive the world, but rather that science 
conceived nature as the sort of thing that could be measured 
and controlled. 
While this led Heidegger to despair, Marcuse proposed 
an alternative concept of nature’s potentialities. He argued 
that under socialism the scientific object construction would 
again include potentialities. But it turns out that we have not 
had to await a socialist revolution to see recognition of the 
potentialities of nature. Already the react ion against the de-
structive asp ects of capitalist technology has motivated sig-
nificant changes neither Heidegger nor Marcuse anticipated. 
These changes affect both the sciences and the technol-
ogies that interact directly with nature. Sciences construct a 
nature artificially isolated from the social context, but that 
context returns when their technical products are imple-
mented in the social world. The dereifying act ion of social 
movements for a sustainable future transforms nature as it 
is encountered historically. These movements address the 
technosciences in terms of a conception of potentiality that 
orients them toward new objects and new applications. The 
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social contextualization of the scientific idea of nature affects 
research without violating its epistemic integrity. 
In conclusion, the concept of technoscience embraces the 
new situation of certain sciences which produce knowledge 
at the same time as they have immediate effects on the social 
world. Those effects include technological applications that 
flow directly from research, but they may also take the form of 
changed attitudes and behaviors. The technosciences thus op-
erate in two registers, as observers of nature and as participants 
in its transformation, both material and symbolic. 
These two registers are institutionally differentiated to 
a considerable extent but meet through policy and public 
dialogue. The differentiation of science and society shows 
up in the fact that the work of scientists in elaborating and 
testing knowledge of nature goes on as it always has. The 
skills involved in that act ivity have not been affected by the 
new proximity of theory and pract ice. At the same time, 
the differentiation is transgressed in the constant transla-
tion between scientific concepts, technology and vernacular 
understanding. Those translations shape society and orient 
scientific work. This understanding of the concept of tech-
noscience is relevant to disciplines such as ecology that in-
corporate science as we know it in a larger framework that 
recognizes what Marx called the “metabolism” joining hu-
manity to nature.
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